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 Abstract—Cognitive Radio (CR), which is the next generation 
wireless communication system, enables unlicensed users or 
Secondary Users (SUs) to exploit underutilized spectrum (called 
white spaces) owned by the licensed users or Primary Users 
(PUs) so that bandwidth availability improves at the SUs, which 
helps to improve the overall spectrum utilization. Collaboration, 
which has been adopted in various schemes such distributed 
channel sensing and channel access, is an intrinsic characteristic 
of CR to improve network performance. However, the 
requirement to collaborate has inevitably open doors to various 
forms of attacks by malicious SUs, and this can be addressed 
using Trust and Reputation Management (TRM). Generally 
speaking, TRM detects malicious SUs including honest SUs that 
turn malicious. To achieve a more efficient detection, we 
advocate the use of Reinforcement Learning (RL), which is 
known to be flexible and adaptable to the changes in operating 
environment in order to achieve optimal network performance. 
Its ability to learn and re-learn throughout the duration of its 
existence provides intelligence to the proposed TRM model, and 
so the focus on RL-based TRM model in this paper. Our 
preliminary results show that the detection performance of RL-
based TRM model has an improvement of 15% over the 
traditional TRM in a centralized cognitive radio network. The 
investigation in the paper serves as an important foundation for 
future work in this research field. 
Keywords—Security; trust; reputation; reinforcement learning; 
cognitive radio  
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of wireless communication, the demand for 
radio spectrum has placed great challenges on the traditional 
spectrum allocation policy, in which the licensed spectrum is 
mostly underutilized. Cognitive Radio (CR) [1] enables 
unlicensed users or Secondary Users (SUs) to sense for and 
opportunistically utilize white spaces without interfering with 
the licensed users or Primary Users’ (PUs’) activities. PUs’ 
activities may or may not exist in underutilized channels at a 
particular time instance. In the absence of PUs’ activities, a 
block of radio resource (e.g. a transmission opportunity) in an 
underutilized channel is regarded as a white space. Hence, CR 
promotes flexibility of channel access through reconfiguration 
of transmission parameters, particularly the operating 
channels.  
An intrinsic characteristic of CR is collaboration, in which 
SUs collaborate with each other (e.g. message exchange) to 
improve network-wide performance. For instance, 
collaborative channel sensing enables SUs to collaborate with 
each other through exchanges of channel sensing outcomes in 
order to improve accuracy of the detection of white spaces. 
The inaccuracy of channel sensing outcomes is caused by 
multipath and shadowing, and so a very robust and accurate 
sensing capability on each SU is necessary if collaboration is 
not implemented. Hence collaboration helps to achieve 
robustness without imposing radical requirements on 
individual SU [3]. However, collaboration has inevitably laid 
SUs open to attacks. In Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), 
each SU may be potentially malicious. A single false sensing 
outcome from a malicious SU to a SU Base Station (SU BS), 
which serves as a fusion center or to clusterhead respectively, 
may cause inaccuracy in the final decision. Consequently, SU 
network performance will be affected. Moreover, there are 
many types of SUs competing to use the underutilized 
channels, including honest, faulty, selfish, and malicious SUs, 
as well as SUs that launch collusion attacks. The faulty SUs 
are malfunctioning devices, or they may be located in fading 
or shadowing zones, and so they send inaccurate sensing 
outcomes to the fusion center or their respective neighbors. 
The selfish and malicious SUs are motivated by their specific 
intentions to monopolize and interfere with either the SUs or 
the PUs, respectively. The SUs that launch collusion attacks 
are either malicious or selfish, and they jointly launch attacks 
to interfere with PUs or break the rules of CR for either selfish 
gain or malicious intention. 
To address the above problem, Trust and Reputation 
Management (TRM) has been adopted to identify the 
misbehaving SUs (e.g. faulty, selfish and malicious) among 
collaborating SUs. Reinforcement Learning (RL) is applied to 
TRM in order to dynamically tackle honest SUs behavior 
which may turn malicious (e.g. the SUs may not relay packets 
for PUs as agreed) as time progresses. In [14], RL based 
auction algorithm for dynamic spectrum access has been 
applied to CRNs. However, to the best of our knowledge, RL-
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B. Trust and reputation management in cognitive radio 
networks 
TRM for CRNs is a framework to identify malicious SUs 
and verify data authenticity. The trust of an entity represents 
its reputation value, which is calculated based on the entity’s 
action or information (e.g. the expected delivery of packets for 
PUs as agreed) in different time period. Higher reputation 
value indicates greater trust of the entity among its 
community. The main objective of TRM is to promote trust 
amongst the SUs in order to lessen the negative impact of 
mistrust SUs. Specifically, it detects mistrust SUs or false 
sensing outcomes, and reduces the effects of mistrust, such as 
false positive and false negative. TRM aims to ameliorate the 
effects of attacks on tasks that require collaboration among 
entities through the detection of malicious SUs or manipulated 
information.  
The TRM schemes in CRNs involve the detection of 
various kinds of entities (e.g. malicious SUs that generate 
false sensing outcomes, and those that interfere with PUs), and 
events (e.g. PUs existence). For instance, TRM schemes in 
[4]-[10] detects malicious SUs that intentionally or 
unintentionally generate false sensing outcomes by ignoring 
their false sensing outcomes, which may be used by a fusion 
center to make final decisions, while [11] detect malicious 
SUs that disobey the channel access rules and continue to 
access the channels in the presence of PUs activities. 
C. Application of RL-based TRM model in Cogntive Radio 
Networks 
To facilitate the opportunistic access of white spaces, 
CRNs offers Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) [22], which 
enables SUs to intelligently share local available channels 
among themselves based on their instantaneous demands. 
While DSA helps to improve resource utilization without 
regulating spectrum demand and access behaviors, it may face 
significant degradation in access reliability [23]. To ameliorate 
such negative effects, a DSA approach called spectrum leasing 
has been proposed [24]. This approach allows PUs to 
temporarily transfer and trade the licensed spectrum usage 
rights of the white spaces to SUs in exchange for monetary 
compensation [25-27] or packets relaying [28, 29]. To the best 
of our knowledge, the security features in spectrum leasing in 
CRNs is lacking and further security enhancements would 
need to be developed in order to provide a better measure of 
security. 
While attacks on CRNs can be perceived in many forms 
such as unintentional, intentional, single, and collusion 
attacks, it is worth to note that all these attacks are operating 
in a dynamic environment. To increase the defense in 
spectrum leasing, TRM would need to be intelligent enough to 
learn and re-learn from the dynamic environment in order to 
be always ahead of the attackers so as to counter their attacks. 
This paper presents a preliminary investigation on the 
application of RL-based TRM to spectrum leasing in CRNs in 
order to enhance its security measures. 
III. PROPOSED RL-BASED TRM MODEL FOR SPECTRUM 
LEASING 
In CRNs, SUs can interact with PUs to negotiate and 
collaborate on leasing the licensed channels in return for 
channel access. The objective of the proposed model is to 
improve PUs transmission rate, throughput, end-to-end delay 
performances and energy efficiency through selecting the 
honest SUs to collaborate. In our model, SUs form an 
alternative route and offer their services as an intermediate 
relay node in order to enhance PUs. To reciprocate, SUs can 
‘piggy back’ some of its own data while acting as a relay.  
We model the environment of spectrum leasing via auction 
mechanism as follows: 
• Step 1: The PU BS determines the cost and duration of 
the white spaces.  
• Step 2: The PU BS broadcasts the cooperation 
information (e.g. spectral bands, SNR and cost) to SU 
BS.  
• Step 3: The SU BS broadcasts the cooperation 
information to its SU hosts.  
• Step 4: The SU hosts determine optimum transmission 
and relaying strategies using the cooperation 
information while the SU hosts determine bid values.  
• Step 5: The SU hosts send their respective strategies 
and bids to SU BS.  
• Step 6: Depending on the SUs’ reputation values, SU 
BS decides to lease or not the channels to SU 
• Step 7: The SU BS sends its decisions to PU BS.  
• Step 8: The PU BS decides to lease or not, and select 
suitable SUs as relays. 
• Step 9: The PU BS transmits packets; and the SU BS 
divides the spectral band and allocates orthogonal sub-
bands, as well as the access time, to each SU, and the 
SUs transmit packets.  
A general equation to calculate reputation value is as 
follows: 
 
                 ݎ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ݎ௜ሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൅ ሺെ1ሻௗ೔ሺ௧ሻା஽ሺ௧ሻ                 (1) 
 
where ݀௜ሺݐሻ is the sensing outcome of SU i and ܦሺݐሻ is the 
final decision given by a fusion center [16]. In our spectrum 
leasing model, ݎ௜ሺݐሻ  increases when SU i has successfully 
relay the packets for PU, where ݀௜ሺݐሻ is the expected packet 
relay destination of SU i and ܦሺݐሻ  is the packet relay 
destination requested by PU. 
In CRNs, choosing honest SUs to collaborate in spectrum 
leasing may increase the overall network performance. 
However, due to the possibility of attacks from malicious SUs, 
selecting the right SUs to collaborate may be a challenge. In 
addition, there is no guarantee that the chosen SUs will 
continue to remain honest throughout the duration of spectrum 
leasing. Hence, it is critical to develop a TRM model that is 
robust and adaptable to the operating environment in order to 
increase the detection efficiency of malicious SUs.  
Generally speaking, as seen from Fig. 2, the Q-learning 
algorithm works by estimating the values of state-action pairs. 
For each state-action pair, the agent observes its short-term 
reward (or delayed reward), and learns its long-term reward 
(or discounted reward) as time progresses. The state-action 
pairs and their respective discounted rewards are represented 
by Q-values, which are kept in a two-dimensional Q-table. 
The delayed reward ݎ௧ାଵሺݏ௧ାଵሻ is received after the agent has 
taken the action at time ݐ ; while the discounted reward 
ߛ max௔א஺ ܳ௧ሺݏ௧ାଵ, ܽሻ  represents the cumulative rewards 
received by the agent in future. To re-iterate, the Q-value 
ܳ௧ሺݏ௧, ܽ௧ሻ update is represented in (2). 
 
     ܳ௧ାଵሺݏ௧, ܽ௧ሻ ՚ ሺ1 െ ߙሻܳ௧ሺݏ௧, ܽ௧ሻ ൅ ߙሾݎ௧ାଵሺݏ௧ାଵሻ ൅                                  ߛ max௔א஺ ܳ௧ሺݏ௧ାଵ, ܽሻሿ                             (2)            
 
For each random initial state ሺݏ௧, ܽ௧ሻ, initialize Q-table 
entry ܳ௧ሺݏ௧, ܽ௧ሻ ՚ 0 
Observe current state ݏ௧ 
For each time step ݐ  : 
   Select an action ܽ௧ and execute it 
   Receive delayed reward ݎ௧ାଵሺݏ௧ାଵሻ 
   Observe the new state ሺݏ௧ାଵሻ 
   Update the Q-table entry for ܳ௧ሺݏ௧, ܽ௧ሻ as in (1) 
   ݐ ՚ ݐ ൅ 1 
End for 
Fig. 2. Q-Learning Algorithm 
 
The discount factor ߛ  emphasizes on the importance of 
future rewards. If ߛ ൌ 1 , the agent considers the same 
weightage for both delayed and discounted rewards. If ߛ ൌ 0, 
the agent only considers the delayed reward, and in this case, 
it is called a myopic approach as compared to the most far-
sighted approach which has ߛ ൌ 1. 
As shown in the Q-learning algorithm, an agent will 
continue to learn to improve its learning experience until an 
optimal policy is found. When an agent selects an appropriate 
action for a state-action pair, the respective Q-value increases, 
and vice-versa. Hence, in order to maximize cumulative 
reward over a period of time, the agent learns to take the 
optimal or near-optimal policy ߨכ  (or a series of actions), 
which has the optimal Q-value given a particular state as 
shown in (3). 
 
                         ܸగכሺݏ௧ሻ ൌ max௔א஺ ܳ௧ሺݏ௧, ܽሻ                         (3) 
The learning rate ߙ determines to what extent the newly 
acquired knowledge overrides the previously learnt Q-value. If 
ߙ ൌ 1 , the agent considers the most current Q-value. The 
higher the learning rate value ߙ, the greater the current learnt 
knowledge overrides the old. Higher learning rate speeds up 
the learning process and this may lead to faster convergence; 
however, it also causes the agent to respond more drastically 
to each reward update, which may destabilize the learning 
process and subsequently, the agent may not converge. On the 
other hand, a lower learning rate provides a smooth and 
predictable learning behavior of an agent, and the time taken 
to converge may be longer 
The RL-based TRM model is shown in Table I. State ݏ௧௜ 
represents the SU neighbor nodes or reputation values. Action 
ܽ௧௜  represents the selection of a neighbor node ݆ which has the 
highest reputation value for collaboration. Reward of a state-
action pair ݎ௧௜൫ݏ௧௜, ܽ௧௜ ൯  represents the cost incurred in 
collaboration with neighbor node ݆.  
 
TABLE I STATE, ACTION AND REWARD FOR RL-
BASED TRM MODEL 
State 
State ݏ௧௜ ൌ ൫݌௝,௧௜ ൯ א ܵ, p௝,௧ ௜ א ሼ1, 2, … , ܲሽ , 
where ݌௝,௧௜  represents the reputation values of 
neighbor node ݆ א ܬ , where ܬ  indicates all 
neighbor nodes of node ݅. 
Action Action ܽ௧௜ א ܣ  represents the selection of a neighbor node ݆ to collaborate. 
Reward 
Reward ݎ௧ାଵ௜ ൫ݏ௧௜, ܽ௧௜ ൯  א ሼെ1,1ሽ represents a 
constant value to be rewarded to all 
collaborating nodes. Value 1 indicates the 
packets have been sent to the expected 
destination.  
 
The following sections discuss the simulation scenario, 
simulation parameters, and preliminary results. As a 
preliminary investigation, a myopic approach of RL is used in 
the simulation. 
A. Simulation Scenario 
The RL-based TRM model is deployed at the SU BS. We 
consider a static network in a time-slotted environment, with 
SU BS located at the center of ܯ SU nodes (Fig. 1). As an 
initial investigation, we consider SU BS interacts with PU 
directly. When unutilized channel is available, PU notifies SU 
BS, which then broadcasts the cooperation information to its 
SU hosts. Upon receiving the information, SU hosts send their 
respective bids to SU BS. Using the RL-based TRM model, 
SU BS filters out the malicious SUs from collaboration. 
During the collaboration process i.e. relaying packets for PU, 
there are ܰ  SUs that turn malicious and perform random 
attacks.  A traditional TRM and RL-based TRM are used to 
detect malicious SUs. During each round of packets relay, 
random attack is launched.  
Fig. 1.   Topology for collaborative chan
CRNs 
 
B. Simulation Parameters 
The simulation parameters are shown in T
scenario, learning rate ߙ ൌ 0.2  is chosen. A
investigation, we use a myopic approach with 
 
TABLE II   NOTATIONS AND PARAMET
SETTINGS USED IN THE SIMULATION
Category Symbol Details 
Initialization N Number of 
collaborating  
nodes (SUs) 
M Number of 
malicious SUs 
Q-learning ߙ Learning rate 
ߛ Discount factor 
 
C. Simulation results and discussions 
 Fig. 2 shows the comparison of the detect
of traditional TRM and RL-based TRM m
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based TRM would have lesser previous lear
 
nel leasing in 
able II. In this 
s a preliminary 
γ ൌ 0.  
ERS 
 
Values
20
1 to 7
0.2
0
ion performance 
odels when the 
 in the network 
erage number of 
malicious SUs 
s indicates more 
simulation result 
RL-based TRM 
aditional model. 
to 30 per cent of 
rformance is due 
re-learn from its 
 noted that there 
RL-based TRM 
 (< 5%) or high 
 is low, the RL-
nt knowledge of 
each node behavior, hence its perfo
the traditional TRM. Similarly, whe
SUs is high, the learning process 
mimic the traditional TRM since h
SUs indicates easier detection. 
 From the analysis, further inve
out to refine the RL algorithm to im
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IV. CONCLU
This paper advocates the use 
efficient method to detect maliciou
RL enable SUs to observe, learn an
dynamic operating environment w
obey a predefined set of rules. Thi
RL provides a competitive edge 
where the SUs may not be necessar
may turn malicious as time progres
that it is capable of achieving 
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an effective approach, the existin
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performance. 
V. FUTURE
The preliminary simulation a
effectiveness of the RL-based TRM
possible improvements can be carrie
• to introduce more than on
environment in order to 
scenario. 
• to incorporate discount fac
exploitation into the RL alg
efficient detection mechani
rmance is similar to that of 
n the number of malicious 
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of RL to achieve a more 
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d respond accordingly in a 
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s intrinsic characteristic of 
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y honest or the honest SUs 
ses. RL-based TRM shows 
higher detection rate as 
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 to improve PUs’ network 
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nd analysis show the 
 model.  However, several 
d out as follows: 
e PUs and CRNs in the 
provide a comprehensive 
tor ߛ, and exploration and 
orithm to provide a more 
sm. Investigation can be 
done on the RL algorithm to find a trade-off between 
exploration and exploitation in order to yield higher 
rewards.  
• to perform thorough security measures through testing 
the RL-based TRM under various attacks scenarios 
such as sybil attacks [2] and collusion attacks [30,19].  
• to analyze and determining learning rate to reduce false 
positive. 
• to decrease the probability of malicious SUs in 
collaboration, hence increasing the overall spectrum 
utilization, and PUs and SUs quality of service 
performance. 
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